Punctuality and maintenance

Infrastructure and rolling stock

Paris 2017-03-02

Trafikverket Swedish transport administration

Rikard Granström, PhD Project manager Maintenance Southern iron ore line and Haparanda line






Iron ore line Riksgränsen -Luleå

- Most beautiful railway in Sweden
- Core network
- Single line (arctic circle)
- Traffic: Iron ore, cupper ore, steel-slabs, goods, timber and passenger traffic
- Produce 25-30 MGT/year
- Operational since 1887
- Electrified since 1915
- 53 stations
- 750 m trains
- 30 32,5 tons axel load
- 120 130 ton per wagon
- 68 wagons per train
- IORE Locomotive 15.000 Hp

Haparanda line Boden -Haparanda

New ERTMS line





















Predetermined maintenance






Condition based maintenance



support for maintenance planning and maintenance execution (remaining time to fault)







6 2017-03-15




Dewirement http://www.youtube.com/watch?v= m09W479sqhQ&feature=related


Pantograph damage http://www.youtube.com/watch?v= XgCPPeYmyKw

Bad track https://www.youtube.com/watch?v= JuP2ZDMh9I8 1:25






Systems and stakeholders' interrelations A combined maintenance process






Study of contact wire/pantograph interface





Statistics input to analysis





Failure modes and detectability

Priority	Contact wire failure modes	Detectability
1	Pantograph motion path obstructed	2
2	Horizontal displacement from working point	5
3	Rapid change of contact wire height	2
4	Hoarfrost	3
5	Too thin contact wire	8
6	Vertical displacement from working point	3
7	Contact wire tension is either too high or too low	6
Priority	Pantograph failure modes	Detectability
1	Lift pressure too high	4
2	Damaged carbon slipper	3
3	Lift pressure too low	4
4	Incorrect dynamic motion	9



Failure mode effect and criticality analysis FMECA

FMEA


End item: Operating period:			Item: Revision:				Prepared by: Date:				
ltem ref.	Item description and function	mo	Failure mode code failure causes	Local Final effect effect	Detection method	Compensating provision against failure	Severity class	Frequency or probability of occurrence	Remarks		
	 Asses Asses Define 	nize the s critical s the ma the info the right	lity of ainter ormat	failure nance (ion pro	e mode conce ofile (w	es pt for /hat i	the sy nforma	ation do w	ve nee	ed to	

Figure A.1 – Example of the format of an FMEA worksheet


/EC 2643/05



Contact wire failure modes




Applied contact wire detection methods VS need for information






Pantograph failure modes





Applied pantograph detection methods VS need for information





Results from implementation of results from FMECA on level crossings in 2012



All faults

Anläggningsindivid (vf) (Alla) 💌

Antal av Felrap	oport Id	
Year	" T	Summa
Tear	2008	90
	2009	95
	2010	97
	2011	75
	2012	50
	2013	50
	2014	38
	2015	44
	2016	48
Totalsumma		587

Signaling faults

Anläggningsdel (vf)		(flera objekt)	" T
Orsak +	(flera objekt)	Ψ.	
Anläggningsindivid (vf)		(Alla)	¥
Antal av Felra	pport Id		
Year	. T.	Summa	
Tear	2008		70
	2009		74
	2010		65
	2011		54
	2012		39
	2013		35
	2014		28
	2015		31
	2016		42
Totalsumma		4	38

No fault found

Anläggningsdel (vf)		(flera objekt)	. T
Orsak +		(flera objekt)	ΨT,
Anläggningsin	divid (vf)	(Alla)	Ŧ
Antal av Felra	pport Id		
Year	. T.	Summa	
rear	2008		39
	2009		42
	2010		33
	2011		31
	2012		18
	2013		16
	2014		14
	2015		13
	2016		19
Totalsumma		2	25



Questions ©







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